At the 2021 Annual Meeting, members of The American Law Institute voted to approve Tentative Draft No. 2 of Principles of the Law, Compliance and Enforcement for Organizations. The vote marks the completion of this project.
Jennifer H. Arlen Posts
The Nature of Compliance Risk and Compliance Risk Management
Jennifer H. Arlen | May 6 2021 | Compliance and Enforcement for Organizations
Principles of the Law, Compliance and Enforcement for Organizations, Tentative Draft No. 2 (TD2) will be presented to ALI membership at the 2021 ALI virtual Annual Meeting. The below Introductory Note and black letter is excerpted from this draft, which contains § 4.01. Nature of Compliance Risk and Compliance Risk Management.
The Law of Corporate Investigations and the Global Expansion of Corporate Criminal Liability
Jennifer H. Arlen | Nov 12 2019 | Compliance and Enforcement for Organizations
This article demonstrates the central role that the law controlling corporate investigations plays in determining the effects of corporate criminal liability and enforcement policies.
The Role of the Board of Directors and Executive Management in Promoting an Organizational Culture of Compliance and Risk Management
Jennifer H. Arlen | Apr 24 2019 | Compliance and Enforcement for Organizations
The following entry is excerpted from the Black Letter of Tentative Draft No. 1, § 3.07 The Role of the Board of Directors and Executive Management in Promoting an Organizational Culture of Compliance and Risk Management.
Qualifications of Primary Governance Actors for Compliance and Risk Management
Jennifer H. Arlen | Apr 10 2019 | Compliance and Enforcement for Organizations
The following entry is excerpted from the Black Letter and Comments of Tentative Draft No. 1; Section 3.06 Qualifications of Primary Governance Actors for Compliance and Risk Management.
Corporate Criminal Enforcement in the United States: Using Negotiated Settlements to Turn Potential Corporate Criminals into Corporate Cops
Jennifer H. Arlen | Jul 27 2017 | Compliance and Enforcement for Organizations
Corporate criminal enforcement in the United States differs from other countries in three ways. First, the United States can impose criminal liability on corporations in a broader range of cases than other countries. Second, almost all corporate criminal resolutions involving large firms take the form of negotiated settlements. Third, the United States grants prosecutors both more choices and more discretion when resolving criminal cases: prosecutors can enter into guilty pleas or pre-trial diversion agreements (deferred and non-prosecution agreements).